Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison by Joel Slemrod
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
TAXEFFECTSON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S.:
EVIDENCE FROM A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON
Joel Slemrod





This paper was prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference
on International Aspects of Taxation held on February 24-25, 1989 in Nassua
Bahamas.I am grateful to David Hartman, other conference attendees, and to
the participants at the NBER Summer Institute for valuable comments and
suggestions.I also acknowledge the help of Leticia Fernandez and Ken Timbers
in providing exceptionally able research assistance, and of Julian Alworth for
graciously providing critical data.This paper is part of NBER's research
program in Taxation.Any opinions expressed are those of the author not those
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3042
July 1989
TAX EFFECTS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S.:
EVIDENCE FROM A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON
ABSTRACT
Thispaper investigates how the tax system of the U.S. and the capital—
exporting country combine to affect the flow of foreign direct investment
(FOl)into theU.S.First, using aggregate data, it corroborates earlier work
suggesting that the U.S.effectivetax rate does influence the amount of FO!
financedby transfers of funds, but not the amount financed by retained
earnings.The data are then disaggregated by major capital—exporting
countries to see if, as theory would suggest, FO! from countries which exempt
foreign—source income from taxation is more sensitive to U.S. tax rates than
FOl from countries which attempt to tax foreign-source income.The data
ana'ysis does not revea'a c'ear differentia' responsiveness between these two
groups of countries, suggesting either difficulties in accurately measuring
effective tax rates or the availability of financial strategies which render
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The magnitude and financing of foreign direct investment in the U.S.,
which totalled more than S40 billion in 1987,is potentially influenced by the
tax systems of both the U.S. and the investor's country.Nevertheless, all re-
cent studies of foreign direct investment (henceforth FM) in theU.S. have in-
vestigated only the impact of U.S. taxation.The home country's tax system has
been ignored either because the appropriate data is unavailable or, ontheoret-
ical grounds, it is deemed to be irrelevant to FDI.
This paper investigates the impact of both the U.S. and home country tax-
ation on FM in the U.S.It does this by firstextendingand updating the
standard model of aggregate FM in the U.S., and then disaggregatingFIJI by the
country of the investing firm so as to facilitate the study ofhome country in—
fluences, including taxation.
The results of this new empirical approach are generally supportiveof a
negative impact of U.S. effective rates of taxation on total FM and new trans-
fers of funds, but not on retained earnings.The disaggregated analysis does
not, though, provide much support for several propositionsabout the impact an
FIJI in the U.S. of foreign countries! tax rates and systems of taxingforeign—
source income.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.Section 2 reviews the
existing empirical literature, and Section 3 discusses some of theimportant
issues regarding data on FM in the U.S.The next two sections present the
results of the data analyses——in Section 4 for aggregate FDI and InSection 5
separately for each of seven major investing countries.Section 6 concludes.2. Review of the Existing Empirical Literature
It is generally accepted that foreign direct investment is primarily an
issue of industrial organization.Dunning (1985, p.6—7) has argued that FUt
by firms of country A in country B is more likely if A's firms (i) possess
ownership—specific advantages relative to B's firms in sourcing markets,
(ii) find it profitable to use these advantages themselves rather than lease
them to B's firms, and (iii) find it profitable to utilize their omership
specific advantages in B rather than A.A large body of empirical literature
has been addressed to testing this theory of international production, usually
referred to as the "eclectic" theory.Much of this research has been cross—
sectional, relating the extent of foreign investment in a given sector to
characteristics of that sector that represent ownership—specific and location—
specific comparative advantages.Several examples of this type of analysis are
contained is Dunning (198-5).
Studies of the effects of taxation on FM have generally taken the per-
spective that whatever its benefits to firms are, they must be balanced against
the tax consequences of carrying out FifE.The tax systems of both the firm's
home country and potential host countries can affect the incentives concerning
FDI as well as how to finance a given pattern of Ff1.Theoretical treatments
of these questions are presented in Alworth (1988) and Gersovitz (1987). The
limited empirical literature on the impact of taxes on multinationals' behavior
is summarized in Caves (1982).
Empirical study focusing on the effect of taxation on the time series of
FDI in the U.S. was pioneered by Hartman (1984).Using annual data from 1965
to 1979 he estimated the response of FDI, separately for investment financed by
retained earnings and transfers from abroad, to three variables:the after—tax
rate of return realized by foreign investors in the U.S.,theoverall after—tax—3—
rate of return on capital in the U.S., and the tax rate on U.S. capital owned
by foreigners relative to the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by U.S. investors.
The first two terms are meant to proxy for the prospective return to new !DI,
the first term being more appropriate for firms considering expansion of cur-
rent operations and the second nore applicable to the acquisition of existing
assets which are not expected to earn extraordinary returns based on production
of differentiated products or possession of superior technology.The relative
tax term is designed to capture the possibility that tax changes which apply
only to U.S. investors will, by affecting the valuation of assets, alter the
foreign investor's cost and therefore the return to acquiring the asset.1
Hartman does not attempt to measure either an effective withholding tax
rate or the foreign income tax rate applied to the aggregate of foreign direct -
investment.He defends their absence by noting the likelihood that the average
values of these tax rates are relatively constant over time.Furthermore, no
attempt is made to measure the alternative rate of return available abroad to
foreign investors.
Hartman's regression results reveal a positive association of both after—
tax rate of return variables with the ratio to U.S. GNP of Ff1 financed by re-
tained earnings, and a negative association of the FDI—CNP ratio with the rela-
tive tax rate on foreigners compared to domestic residents.The model does not
explain transfers from abroad as well as retained earnings, although coeffi-
cients of all three variables have the expected sign and are significantly
different from zero.Hartman concludes from this research that the effect of
1Hartman argues that the variable measuring the rate of return to domestic
capital, because it is based on replacement costs, will not capture these val-
uation effects.—4—
taxes on FIJI, both that implied by reinvestment of earnings and that accom-
plished by explicit transfer of funds,is quite strong.
Boskin and Cale (1986) re—estimate Hartman's equation using the updated
tax rate and rate of return series from Feldstein and Jun (1986).Although the
estthated elastictties of FIJI to the rates of return are somewhat lower, none
of the point estimates changes by more than one standard devtation.They also
extend the sample forward to 1984, and in some cases backward to 956, and ex-
periment with a variety of alternative explanatory variables and functional
forms.They conclude that although the results are somewhat sensitive to sam-
ple period and specification, the qualitative conclusions of Hartman are fairly
robust.
Young (1988) uses revised data on investment, GNP and rates of return
earned by foreigners to estimate similar equations.These changes increase the
estimated elastIcities with respect to the rate of return realized by foreign-
ers and the relative rate of return.However, the equations for new transferR
of funds estimated using the years 1956—84 yIeld very poor results, suggesting
to Young that the stmple Hartman model is inadequate for studying foreign di-
rect investment through new funds when applied to the expanded sample period.
Relaxing Hartman's assumption of a unitary income elasticity and including the
lagged dependent variable as a right—hand side variable does not substantially
alter the conclusions for retained earnings (although the estimated responsive-
ness is significantly lower), but the tax responsiveness of transfer of new
funds still is not supported.
Newlon (1987) reexamines the results of Hartman as well as Boskin and
Gale.. During his attempt at replication, he discovered that the series measur-
ing the rate of return on foreign direct investment, used in all earlier
papers, had been miscalculated from the original Bureau of Economic Analysisdata for the years 1965 to 1973.Using the corrected series the equation ex-
plaining retained earnings does not fit as well, although the equation explain-
ing transfers fits better.tn explaining retained earnings, the estimated co-
efficients on the return to FDI and the tax ratio are slightly larger in abso-
lute value and remain statistically significant, although the estimated coef-
ficient on the net return in the U.S. is lower and is no longer statistically
significant.For transfers of funds, the estimated coefficient on the return
to FDI is much larger and becomes significant, although the estimated coeffi-
cient on the net return in the U.S. becomes smaller and insignificant. When the
sample period is extended to range from 1956 to1984, Newlon's results also
differ from those of Hartman and those of Soskin and Gale.tn particular, the
equation explaining transfer of funds fits poorly, and no estimated coefficient
is significant.2
tt is notable that none of these studies has deviated very far from the
approach taken in Hartman's 1984 paper.Although Young (1988) refers to
Feldstein's (1982) dictum that, in the absence of a perfectly specified
model, many alternative models should be investigated, the empirical research
has been extremely one—tracked.This is a sufficient reason to explore alter-
native methodologies.Furthermore, there are several problems with the stan-
dard approach which bear further study.
tn the previous literature, the disincentive to investment caused by the
tax system is implicitly measured by an average tax rate, computed as total
2Newlon also estimates variants of Hartman's original model with several addi-
tional variables, including a quadratic time trend, dummy variables for the
years when data revisions were made, and with a definition of the return to
direct investment that includes the fees and royalties that accrue to the
parent from its foreign subsidiary.Most of these changes do not alter the
qualitative results reported earlier.—6—
taxespaid divided by a measure of profits.However, the incentive to under-
take new investment depends on the effective marginal tax rate which, asis
well know-n, can deviate substantially from an average tax rate concept.
None of the existing studies attempts to estimate the effect of the home
country's tax system on FM in the U.S.Ofcourse, collecting the appropriate
data is difficult and perhaps, as Hartman argued, these tax rates have not
in fact varied much.The observed stability, though, applies to statutory tax
rates and not necessarily to the mare appropriate effective marginal, tax rates.
There is also a theoretical reason to focus attention on the host country tax
rate.Hartman (1985) has argued that only the host country's tax system mat-
ters for investment coming from subsidiaries' earnings, even when the home
country taxes its residents on the basis of worldwide income.This is because
the home country's tax equally reduces the parent's return to art investment
and the opportunity cost of making an investment (remitting a dividend to the
parent).3Thus, for any subsidiary whose desired investment exceeds earnings,
the tax due upon repatriation of earnings does matter.This situation would
tikely occur for newly formed subsidiaries.In any event, it is worthwhile to
investigate empirically the impact of both the home country's rate of taxation
and its system of taxing foreign—source income.
The interpretation of the estimated coefficient on the rate of return
to FM variable is also problematic, as stressed by Newlon.This rate of re-
turn is defined as the after—tax income from direct investment divided by the
stock of direct investment.When the home country has a foreign tax credit
with deferral, itis often optimal for the subsidiary to finance investment by
first using retained earnings, and only when these earnings are exhausted to
31f, however, the home country's tax system is expected to change, then there
is an incentive to time repatriations appropriately.use funds transferred from the parent firm.This hierarchy of financing th—
plies that whenever a subsidiary's investment exceeds its retained earnings,
its retained earnings will exactly equal its income.Thus for these firms we
tould expect a direct association between the calculated rate of return (in
which after—tax income is the numerator) on FM and retained earnings, regard-
less of whether the average rate of return in fact influences decisions con-
cerning new FDt.As Newlon notes, if subsidiaries were following a fixed div-
idend payout rule (e.g., it pays out a fixed fraction of income), a direct as-
sociation between income and retained earnings would also be observed.This
argument may also apply to subsidiaries of firms residing in countries that
employ territorial systems of taxation, thus rendering problematic any ob-
served empirical association between FM out of retained earnings and real-
ized rate of return.
3. Data tssues
3.1.Definition of Ff1
Ff1, as measured by the 8ureau of Economic Analysis (henceforth 8EA),
consists of earnings retained by subsidiaries and branches of foreign parents
and transfers of funds from the foreign parents to the 11.5. firms, including
both debt and equity transfers.Thus Ff1 does not correspond directly to any
measure of real investment, as it excludes investment financed by funds raised
locally (or in third countries) by the U.S. firm and includes purchases of
existing assets by foreigners.It is more accurately thought of as a measure
of financial flows rather than of real investment.Unfortunately, no data
exists on real investment made by foreign branches and subsidiaries.Note
also that the data does not distinguish between branches and subsidiaries,
even though in general the tax treatment by the home country of the two forms—8—
of organization is different.Finally, only in this decade has the data on
transfers of funds been disaggregated into debt and equity transfers,
rendering multivariate analysis impossible at this time.
3.2.Drift from Benchmark Years
The data on FM in the U.S. is based on benchmark surveys conducted by
BEA in 1959,1974, and 1980.For nonbenchmark years, estimates for all series
except ecjuity and intercompany account inflows were constructed by extrapolat-
ing the benchmark data based on sample data from quarterly surveys.The 1959
benchmark data were extrapolated backward to construct estimates for 1950 to
1958 and were extrapolated forward to construct estimates for 1960 to 1973.
The 1974 benchmark data were used to derive estimates for 1974 to 1979, and
the 1980 benchmark data were used for estimates of 1980 and thereafter.Re-
ported equity and intercompany account flows are taken directly from the
quarterly sample with extrapolation, due to the unreliable relationship be—
tweett the reported attd uttreported data.
Note that, except for 1959, the benchmark data is not used to revise the
data based on the quarterly survey for earlier years.This procedure gives
rise to the suspicion that data for nonbencSark years misestimates true FifE.
This suspicion has been confirmed for 1974, because the SEA has compared es-
timates based on the 1974 benchmark survey with estimates based on an extra-
polation from the 1959 benchmark.For equity and intercompany account flows,
the extrapolated total is $2.50 billion compared to S3.70 billion from the
1974 benchmark, an underestimate of more than one third.In contrast, for re-
invested earnings the extrapolated figure is $1.13 billion, actually higher
than the benchmark figure of $1.07 billion.The discrepancy between the two
estimates varies widely by country and by industry, however.—9—
Other importantchanges in concept and definition were introduced with
the 1974benchmarksurvey.The minimum ownership criterion in the definition
of FM was decreased from 25to10percent,a change which in 1974accounted
for $1.2 billion of the $25.1 billion total FM position in the U.S.Also in
1974beganmajor changes in the treatment of unrealized capital gains and
losses, the classification of incorporated insurance affiliates, and the coy—
rage of reverse equity ownership (U.S. affiliates' equity ownership in their
foreign parents).Finally, starting in 1974 FM was classified by the country
of foreign parent —thefirst foreign person in the ownership chain of the
U.S. affiliate.Before 1974, estimates for some affiliates were classified by
the "ultimate beneficial owner," which is the person in the ownership chain,
beginning with the foreign parent, that is not owned more than 50 percent by
another person.This change in classification apparently affected several
large affiliates so that the geographical distribution of the estimates was
significantly affected.
Some of the earlier studies of FM ignored these data definition issues,
while others included a dummy variable to differentiate pre— and post— bench-
mark periods.Rowever, none of the studies directly addressed the apparent
problem that the further away from a benchmark year, the greater the survey—
based numbers misreport actual FM.To account for this tendency, in much of
what follows I utilize a dummy variable whose value is the difference between
the data year and the benchmark year from which the reported data is esti-
mated.Thus this variable has a value of zero in the benchmark years 1959,
1974, and 1980 and a positive value in all other years since 1960 (when the
benchmark data is extrapolated forward).It takes on a maximum value of 14 in
1973, when the benchmark data is extrapolated 14 years forward.This proce-
dure allows for a constant amount of drift between benchmarks of the reported—10—
FDI data.In addition, I consider a duy variable for the period beginning
in 1974 to account for the one—time changes in concepts, definittons, and
classification of FM by country that occurred in that year.
4. Total reign Direct Investment in the U.S.
4.1Trends
Figure 1shows the behavior of FDI in the U.S., as a ratio to U.S. gross
national product (ON?), for the period 1953 to 1987.It also breaks down this
ratio into two components —retainedearnings and new transfers of funds, both
as a ratio to U.S. GNP.
As Figure 1shows, the ratio of FDI to GN? shows no clear trend until
approximately 1972, when it began to grow quickly.By 1974, FM amounted to
0.32% of GNP, or more than four times as high as the average percentage in
the two decades from 1953 to 1972.A second surge of FDI began in 1978,
pushing the ratio to a record O.83Z in 1981 and an average of O.48Z from 1992
to 1984, or five times higher than the 1953—1972 average and two and a half
times the 1977 ratio.In 1987 FDI in the U.S. totalled nearly 942.0 billion,
or 0.94% of the GN? of $4.49 trillion.oth the total FD1 and ratio to GNP in
1987 were all—time highs.
One striking aspect of FDI is the decline within the last decade in the
relative importance of retained earnings compared to new transfers of funds.
Through 1980 retained earnings represented a large, stable component of total
Fill, comprising 37.0% of the total.In 1977, the contribution of retained
earnings relative to new transfers began to fall and by 1981 it began to
decline in absolute terms as well.In the period 1981—7, retained earnings
comprised only 1.4% of total VOl.—1 1—
Isthe rapid growth of FDI in the U.S.since1972 part of a worldwide
trend, or does it instead represent a relative shift of FM to the U.S. from
other locations?Figures 2 and 3 help to answer that question.Figure 2
shows that outward FM from seven major investing nations to countries other
than the U.S. was flat until 1969, when a large boom lasting until 1973
occurred, followed by relative stability and another surge from 1978 through
1981.According to Figure 3, FDI in the U.S.as a fraction of the seven
countries! worldwide FM reached 40.5% in 1969, fell sharply until 1971, and
then rose steadily until an all—time high of 43.7% was reached in 1981. It
has remained at a high level since then.Apparently the strong growth of FM
in the U.S. starting in 1972 does indeed represent an increase in the relative
strength of the U.S. as a location of Fill.
4.2.Analysis
4.2.1Replication of Earlier Findings
As is ritual in this literature,I begin the analysis by trying to re-
produce the aggregate time series results of a predecessor in the literature,
in this case Mewlon (1987).In a break from precedent,I am able to reproduce
his main results to three significant digits.These results are reported in
the first column of Tables and 2.As discussed in Section 2, they suggest a
strong positive association between the after—tax return on FM (denoted
r(1—t)) and FDI financed by retained earnings, but not for new transfers of
of funds.The relative tax rate (denoted Sf-i)variableand the overall
4rhe seven countries, whose direct investment in the U.S. will be analyzed in
more detail below, are Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and West Germany.—12—
rate of return [denoted r1(t—t)J have no significant effect on either corn—
ponent of FIJI.5
Because of my uneasiness about the economic implications of a statistical
association between the components of FDI and the measured average after—tax
rate of return to capital, I next separate out as explanatory variables the
average pre—tax rate of return earned by foreigners (r), the average pre—tax
rate of return earned on all capital in the U.S. (r1), and the two average
tax rate terms(t for the tax rate on foreigners, t1 for the total tax rate
including taxes paid by U.S. residents at the personal level).6The results
are reported in the second column of Tables 1and 2.While the pre—tax return
to Ff1 retains a positive association with the ratio of retained earnings to
CNP, neither tax term is significantly different than zero.However, this is
not the case for transfers of funds.In this case the average tax rate faced
by foreigners does have a -statistically significant negative coefficient and,
as suggested by the theory, the total tax rate faced by a 13.5. investor has a
positive cofficient.
5There are several reasons for the striking differences between Hartman'sre-
sults and the results reported in the first column of TablesI and2.First,
all the data has been corrected and updated.That procedure itself renders
the coefficient on r1(1—t) in the retained earnings equation to be insignifi-
cantly different from zero.Second, Hartan deals with the presence of a neg-
ative retained earnings value by adding a positive constant to the numerator
of the dependent variable.Because the denominator (CNP) is growing with
time, this is tantamount to adding a gradually declining value.Following
Newlon,I add a constant to the left—hand side variable before taking the
logarithm.This reduces the absolute value of most coefficients and renders
r1(1—t) insignificant in the transfers equation.Finally, the regressions of
Tables 1and 2 extend the sample period back from 1965 to 1956 and forward
from 1979 to 1984.The latter eliminates the significance of r(1—t) in the
transfer equation and the combination of the two renders (1—tDI (1—t)
insignificant in both equations.
6As Hartman (1984) notes, no separate estimate of the pre—tax rate of return
to FDI is available.The value used for r is obtained by assuming the average
rate of corporate and property tax faced by foreigners in the U.S.(t) is the
same as that faced by U.S. residents, and solving for r using the known value
of r(1—t).—13—
Note that these results concerning the tax rate variables reverse the
conclusions of Hartman (1984), who concluded that the behavior of retained
earnings was consistent with expectations, but that the estiniated response of
transfers of new funds did not conform to expectations.I attribute his first
finding to the inevitable relationship between retained earnings and a measure
of rate of return whose numerator is highly correlated with retained earnings.
I next replace the two measures of average tax rate by a measure of the
marginal effective corporate tax rate on fixed investnient (r) in the U.S.,
as calculated by Auerbach and Hines (1988).This is arguably a better measure
of the expected tax burden on a prospective new investnient.These results,
shown in column 3 of Tables 1and 2, suggest that the U.S. marginal tax rate
has had a significant effect on transfer of funds, but not on retained earn-
ings.7The coefficient on the tax rate corresponds to a tax elasticity of
transfers of —1.40, when evaluated at the average transfers to GNP racio over
the period.8
None of the previous work reports the results of equations explaining to-
tal FDI in the U.S., but considers only its component parts (retained earnings
and transfer of funds).Table 3 reports the results of repeating the regres-
sions of Tables1 and 2 for total FDI.These results strongly support the
negative association of total FDI with U.S. taxation.The elasticity of re-
sponse is —1.16, slightly less than that estimated for transfers alone.
7The conclusion does not depend on the log—linear specification.A linear
version of these regressions yields the same conclusion.
8The tax elasticity is equal to (1±),whereis the estimated tax rate
coefficient, 7isthe average ratioyof transfers to U.S. GNP, and k is the
constant added to this ratio before taking the logarithm.—14—
In Column 4 of Tables 1,2, and 3,I preaent the reaulta of the aimpleat
poaaible formulation of this model, with only the effective marginal tax rate
on new investment included as an explanatory variable.The principal reason
for eliminating the rate of return variables is to investigate whether the
estimated negative tax effect may be related to the definitional relationship
between the dependent variable and these measures.The results do not indi-
cate this problem is a real one.The tax variable still has no significant
association with retained earnings, but does have a statistically significant
negative association with transfers and total FDI.
4.2.2.New Specifications
In this section the robustness of the finding that both new transfers of
funds and total FDI, but not retained earnings, have a significant negative
association with the effective rate of U.S. capital income taxation is tested
against the kinds of specification changes suggested earlier.These changes
are discussed below.
Linear Specification.The simple association between either total FDI
or transfers and the effective tax rate survives the replacement of the log-
arithmic specification with a linear one.For both transfers and total FDI,
the estimated tax rate coefficient implies an elasticity similar to what is ob-
tained in the logarithmic specification; in both cases the estimated tax coef-
ficient is insignificantly different from zero in explaining retained
earnings.
Although there is no theoretical reason for preferring one specification
to the other, because of the presence of negative dependent variables the log—
arithmic specification necessitates the addition to the unlogged value of an
arbitrary constant.This procedure clouds the comparison of estimated—15—
coefficientsacross equations, which becomes important below when home country
disaggregation is done.
Including Other Explanatory Variables.The vector of explanatory var—
iables is expanded to consider potential non—tax influences onforeigndirect
investment.In particular I include the following:9
RGDP:the ratio of total gross domestic product (GDP) of the seven major
investing countries to U.S. GDP, where the foreign GDPs are valued at the
purchasing power parity exchange rates calculated by Summers and Heston (1988).
This variable is meant to capture the effect of the changing relative size of
the principal investing countries compared to the U.S.
USUNEMP:the unemployment rate of prime—age males in the U.S.This var-
iable is meant to capture poendal business cycle effects on FDI.
REXC:the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against a GDP weighted
average of the seven major investing counries currencies.Dunning (1985)
and Pugel (1985) have suggested that a low dollar reduces comparative pro-
duction costs in the U.S., thus providing an incentive to FDI.
DRIFT:a dummy variable equal to the number of years elapsed since the
previous benchmark survey of FDI conducted by BEA.'°
Lagged Tax Rate Terms.Because of the time it takes to implement an in-
vestment decision, there maybea lag between changes in the effective tax
rate and the impact on FDI.To allow for this possibility, not only the
concurrent tax rate bu also the ax rate lagged one year and two years are
See the data appendix for the definftion and source of all the variables used
in the analyses.
'0Other poenial influenceson FDI, for which I wag unable o obtain reason-
able indices, include the exen of current and expected U.S. tariff and
non—tariff barriers o imports, and the degree of quantitative restrictions,
such as exchange controls, on outward foreign direct investment.—16—
included as explanatoryvariableeitThie procedure limits the length oft'ie
tag but imposes no structure on the time pattern of the tagged response of
investment.
The results of estimating this specification are presented in the first
column of Table 4.Of the non—tax explanatory variables, the estimated coef-
ficients on USUNEMP, RGDP, and DRIFT are not significantly different than
zero.The estimated coefficient on the real rate of exchange variable, REXC,
is negative and significant, suggesting that a low dollar may in fact have
stimulated FDI in the U.S)2Though not significant, the DRIFT parameter has
the expected negative sign, suggesting that FDI may be increasingly underesti-
mated as the time elapsed since the previous benchmark survey increases.
Of the tax rate variables, both the current value and the value lagged
two years have a significant negative coefficient.There is substantial multi—
collinearity among the three tax variables, however.The t—statistic on the
estimated sum of —13.3 of the three tax coefficients is —3.67, indicating that
it is different than zero at a 95% level of confidence.The tax rate etastic—
ity is —1.57 when evaluated at mean values for the entire period.
That this result is not robust to all reasonable specification changes is
suggested by the results shown in the second column of Table 4.When a
weighted average of the seven investing countries' unemployment rate is
included (denoted FUMEMP), it is highly positively related to FDI and the tax
110f course this argument also applies to the other influences on FDI.One
promising direction for future work is the investigation of more general lag
structures.
121t has been argued that the strong dollar of the early 1980's was in part
caused by tax incentives given to investment at that time.This suggests
that an instrumental—variables estimation technique may be appropriate.—17—
coefficients now sum to a positive rather than a negative number.13Thus a
competing alternative explanation for the time series of FM is thatit has
14 been propeled by deteriorating economic conditions in the home countries.
tn order to focus on the possible tax influences on FM, the analyses that
follow do not tnclude the foreign unemployment rate variable.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 display the results of disaggre—
gating FM into retained earnings (RE) and transfers of funds (TR).The con-
clusion drawn from Tables1 and2 still holds——that transfers are associated
with taxes negatively, but for retained earnings no negative association is
apparent.'5Finally, in the equation shown in the fifth column of Table 4 the
dependent variable is FM from manufacturing for four countries——Canada, Japan,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.The negative association withU.S.
effective tax rates is still evident, although the estimated elasticity of
response is about three—fifths of what it was for total P1)1.
5. Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. By Investing Country
5.1.Motivation and Theory of Cross—Country Comparisons
Most countries choose one of two basic options for taxing the income
earned abroad by its domestic residents.Under a residence—based (or
3Secause of data availability, the sample period for this regression begins
in 1969 rather than 1960.This is not, however, the source of the differ-
ence in results, because a version of the regression without FUNEMP that be-
gins in 1969 also shows a significant negative tax effect.
4Another variable whose inclusion eliminates the tax effect is the dummy
variable for the post—1974 era, justified above because the SEA definition
of Ff1 was changed in 1974.Apparently much of the estimated tax effect re-
flects the simple fact that the post—1974 era is characterized by high Ff1
and low taxes, relative to the pre—1974 era.
151n fact, the sum of the tax coefficients hasa positive sign that is signif-
icantly different from zero.—18—
"worldwide') system, the capitsl—exporting country taxes its residents! incone
wherever itis earned.To avoid double taxation these countries as a rule
allow their residents (individuals and corporstions) to credit foreign taxea
paid against the domestic tax owed on the foreign income.The credit is un—
ited to the tax due under the home country's tax rules.kny home country tax
lisbility in excess of the tax paid to foreign governments, sometimes termed
the "repatriation tsx," is generally deferred until di:idends are remitted to
the parent company.Under a source—based (also known as a "territorial" or
"exemption") system, foreign—source income is exempt from home country taxa-
tion.Furthermore, no credit is given for tsxes paid to foreign governments.
Which principle applies for a given country may depend on the form the invest-
ment income takes (e.g., dividend, interest, capital gains), thelocation of
the investment (e.g., treaty vs. non—treaty countries), and the extent of
ownership and control exercised by the domestic owner.
The impact of a host country's tax structure on inward foreign investment
depends on the tax system of the capital—exporting country.For example, when
the country of capital export has an exemption tax system, the effective
corporste—level rate of tax on FIJIis equal to the tax rate imposed by the
host country.Therefore differences among host country effective tax rates
would he expected to have an impact on the location decision of investment
from exemption countries.The impact of differences in host countries' tax
structures would be expected to have less influence on foreign investment from
countries which have worldwide tax systems with a foreign tax credit.In a
simple case without deferral, unless the host country's tax rate is higher
than the home country's tax rate, the effective tax rate on FIJI becomes the
home country's, regardless of the tax system of the host country.The effec-
tive tax rate is more complicated when there is deferral, multi—country—19—
investment, and differing definitions of taxable income in different countries.
Nevertheless, for finns based in foreign tax credit countries, the impact of
the host country's tax system is filtered through the tax system of the home
country, and may be substantially mitigated.
Of the major countries that make FM in the U.S., some operate exemption
systems while others operate a worldwide system with foreign tax credit.This
fortuitous divergence of approach invites an investigation of whether the sys-
tem of taxing foreign—source income is a factor in the responsiveness of FD
to host and home country taxation.In what follows I examine the time series
of }tI in the U.S. emanating from seven countries, and investigate whether
these time series are consistent with several propositions about the effect on
FDI of tax rates and systems of taxing foreign—source income.
5.2. Trends
Figures 4A—IOA and 48—108 present the time series of FDI for each of
seven major investing countries, in 4A—IOA as a ratio of U.S. GNP and in
48—108 asa ratio of total FDI in the U.S. by these seven countries.The
figures generally show rapid growth in FM beginning in the early 1970's.
They also show the rise in the relative prominence of Japan, whose Ff1 was
negligible in the 1960's but by 1985 represented nearly 20% of total FDI in
the U.S., and the relative decline of FDI from Canada, which in the 1960's
represented about 30% of FM in the U.S. but by the 1980's comprised signifi-
cantly less than 10% of total FM.The largest investors for most of this
period have been Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, challenged in
the 1980's by Japan.
Another message that the figures convey is that FDI, while generally
(i.e., except for Canada and Italy) growing as a fraction of U.S. GNP since—20—
the early 1970's, has followed somewhat different paths in the seven coun-
tries.Therefore no single story is likely to be sufficient to explain the
behavior of PDI from each of these countries.
5.3.knalysis
As discussed in Section 5.1, analysis of the FM data disaggregated by
the residence of the investing firms can shed further light on the impact of
the host and home country's tax systems on the magnitude and location of for-
eign direct investment.Two empirical strategies are followed.In the first,
separate FDI equations similar to those of Table 4 are estimated for each of
the seven major investing countries.The differences in responsiveness in
taxation are then related to the investing country's system of taxing foreign
income.In particular, the response of countries with exemption systems is
compared to countries with worldwide tax systems and a foreign tax credit. tn
the second approach, country—specific FDI equations are estimated utilizing
time series data on the statutory corporate tax rates and the effective tax
rates on new investment in the home country.These results are then examined
for insights into several propositions relating to the effect of taxes on FDI.
Tables5,6, and 7 present the first set of results for country—specific
FM regressions.Ordinary least—squares is used in each case.
16Table5 con-
tains the equations for retained earnings, Table 6 contains equations explain-
ing transfer of funds, and Table 7is concerned with total FDI, each expressed
as a ratio to U.S. GN?.The explanatory variables used are identical to those
used in the equations of Table 4, except that the overall GD? ratio and over-
all real exchange rate are replaced by country—specific variables.
also experimented with the method of seemingly unrelated regressions to
estimate the seven equations as a system.Secause the results were very
similar to those obtained using OLS,theyare not reported here.—21—
The countries are grouped by their system of taxing income from foreign
direct investment in the U.S.In the first group are countries that effec-
tively exempt such income from domestic taxation ——Canada,France, the
etherlands, and West Germany.'7For these countries' firms it is the U.S. tax
rate, unfiltered by home country tax rules, that affects the attractiveness of
FM in the U.S. compared to alternative investment locations and compared to
no investment at all.
The second group of countries ——Italy,Japan, and the United Kingdom ——
operatea foreign tax credit system with deferral for subsidiaries.U.S.tax
is due on the income as earned.When income is repatriated to the home coun-
try, the grossed—up earnings are subject to home country taxation, but taxes
paid to the U.S. government are credited against tax liability, as long as
this liability does not exceed the home country liability on this income.
What the effective total tax rate on investment is in this situation has
been the subject of some controversy.In the absence of deferral (and assuming
that both home and host country use the same definition of income), the home
country tax rate applies unless the host country tax rate exceeds the home
country rate, in which case the host country rate applies.With deferral,
Hartman (1985) has argued that the host country tax rate is the effective tax
rate on investments which are financed by retained earnings, and the above
reasoning applies to investments financed by new transfers of funds.
This brief look at received wisdom suggests the following propositions:
1.FM from exemption countries should be at least as sensitive to U.S.
tax rates as FM from foreign tax credit countries.
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By statute, Canada and West Germany operate foreign tax credit systems.How-
ever, both countries exempt from domestic taxation business—related income
earned within the borders of its treaty partners, including the U.S.2.The greater sensitivity of FDI from exemption countries for U.S. tax
rates should be most apparent in the behavior of new transfers of funds.
The results shown in Table6offerstrong corroboration for the negative
association of U.S.taxrates and FDI financed by transfers of funds.The
summed tax coefficient is negative for all seven countries, and significantly
different from zero in four of these cases.The estimated tax effect on re-
tained earnings, shown in Table 5,range from significant positive to signifi-
cant negative, with no clear trend emerging.For total FDI (shown in Table 7),
thetax effect is significantly negative for four of seven countries.The tax
effect in these four countries sum to more than the tax effect shown in the
first column of Table 4.
The regression analyses are not strongly supportive of propositions Iand
2.The four countries which have a significant tax effect on transfers and
total FDI are evenly divided between exemption countries (Netherlands and West
Germany) and foreign tax credit countries (Japan and the United Kingdom).The
association of tax rates with retained earnings also has no obvious pattern
according to the tax system.
Table 8 displays the results of repeating the regressions explaining
total FDI for manufacturing investment only.This data is fully available for
only four of the seven countries——Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom.The summed tax effect for Japan and United Kingdom remains
negative and significantly different from zero.The magnitude of the esti-
mated effect shrinks substantially in the case of Japan, reducing the elas-
ticity from —2.90 to —2.25.The estimated elasticity for the United Kingdom
stays about the same as for total FDI.For Canada and the Netherlands, the
summed tax effect is, as for total FDI, not significantly different from zero.—23—
3.4.The Effect of Rome Country Taxation on FM in the U.S.
The rate of home country taxation may influence FDt in the U.S. through
at least two different avenues.First, it affects the after—tax return to
investment in the home country, which is presumably an alternative to FDI.
For this reason we would expect the home country tax rate to be positively
associated with Ff1 in the U.S.
Asecond avenue of influence applies only to home countries that operate
a foreign tax credit system, and not countries wich operate an exemption sys-
tem.Ignoring deferral and assuming that the multinational operates only in
at most the home country and the U.S. ,theeffective tax rate on income from
FM is the maximum of the U.S. rate and the home country rate.13When the
home country rate exceeds the U.S. rate, it is the effective tax rate on both
home country investment and FDt, and so its level does not affect the relative
after—tax returns of the alternative investments, although it does depress the
return of all investment alternatives.In a more general situation, when
there is deferral and rnulticountry operation, the home country tax rate zill
increase the effective tax rate on FT)t, though by less than it increases the
tax rate on investment in the hone country.Recall, however, Hartman's demon-
stration that, for investment out of retained earnings, only the host country's
tax rate is relevant.
'8The home country effective tax rates technically apply to domestically—
located investment.If the tax law discriminates investment by location (as
the U.S. tax law does), then the series on effective tax rates may not ac-
curately capture the tax law's impact on foreign—source income.For example,
French and Japanese corporations engaged in foreign investment are entitled
to deduct from taxable income certain special reserves.Other details of
the home country's tax system may also be important, particularly the degree
of corporate and personal tax integration.For example, although by treaty
dividends from U.S. subsidiaries to West German parent corporations are
untaxed by the West German government, if and when exempt foreign—source in-
come is distributed to shareholders by the parent, it is taxed differently
than dividends from earnings on domestic—source income.—24—
This review of the effects of home country taxstion on 101 suggests the
following propositions:
3.101 from exemption countries should be positively relsted to the rate
of home country taxstion.
4.101 finsnced by new trsnsfers of funds from foreign tsx credit coun-
tries should hsve s less clesrly positive, or even negstive, relstionship to
home country taxstion.
5.Retsined esrnings from foreign tsx credit countries should be
unsffected by, or positively relsted to, home country tsxstion.
Ststutory tax rstes hsve sn influence on multinstionsls' decisions, in-
dependent of their impsct opersting through the effective tsx rstes on invest-
ment.A multinstionsl hss sn incentive to do its borrowing through firms op—
ersting in s country with relstively high ststutory rstes, SOssto msximize
the tax benefits of the interest deductions.This would imply a negative re-
lationship between the volume of transfers and the difference between the U.S.
statutory rate and the home country statutory rate.A multinational also has
an incentive to set transfer prices so as to show lower income in countries
with relatively high statutory rates.Holding other policies constant, this
also implies a negative relationship between reported retained earnings and
the difference between the U.S. statutory rate and the home statutory rate.
These effects should be stronger for exemption countries compared to foreign
tax credit countries.They should also depend only on current statutory tax
rates, with no lagged effect as in the case of investment incentives.The
following proposition summarizes these incentives:
5.Both retained earnings and transfers of funds should be negatively
related to the current differential between the U.S. statutory corporate rate—25—
and the home country statutory corporate rate, with the effect stronger far
exemption countries.
Tables 9,10, and 11 present the results of adding four variables to each
country—specific regression equation:(i) the effective corporate—level tax
rate on new investment in the home country, includingthe current rate and two
lags and (ii) the difference between the U.S. statutory corporatetax rate and
the home country statutory corporate tax rate.Note that these tax rate
series are not available for the Netherlands, so that regressionresults for
only six countries are presented.
The results do not provide much support for Propositions 3—5.According
to table II, in no exemption country is the homecountry's tax rate positively
related to FM.table 10 reveals that the effect of home country taxation on
transfers is not obviously more negative for foreign tax credit countries com-
posed to exemption countries.Table 9 does suggest that retained earnings
are, as proposed, not usually affected by home country taxationin foreign tax
credit countries.Proposition 6 fares slightly better, with a significant co-
efficient of the expected negative sign on the difference in statutory rates
occurring for West Germany and Italy (for transfers of funds and totalFf31),
and no case of a significant positive sign occurring.Note also that the
estimated negative effect of U.S. taxation on total FDI for West Germanyand
Japan disappears when the home country tax rates are included,although a
negative effect of U.S. taxes on Canadian investment appears whenit did not
in the absence of home country tax rates.
There are several possible explanations for the lack of a cleardifference
in the tax responsiveness of FM from exemption and foreign tax credit coun-
tries.One is that the data is simply not good enough to pick up thedif-
ferences in behavior that do in fact exist.In particular, the effective tax—26—
rate series have well—known problems as an accurate measure of the disincen-
tives to invest.Alternatively, it may be that the ability of firms from
foreign tax credit countries to defer indefinitely home country taxation and
to engage in sophisticated financial transactions renders insignificant the
effective rate of hone country taxation,If the latter hypothesis is true,
then the U.S. tax rate is the important source of investment discentives for
all capital—importing countries, regardless of their system of alleviating
international double taxation.
6. Conclusions
This researeh was undertaken in order to shed light on the role of both
U.S. and investing country tax systems on foreign direct investment in the
U.S.Two distinct approaches were attempted.In the first, the standard
empirical model relating total Ff1 in the U.S. to U.S. taxation was respeci—
fied to (i) eliminate the spurious bias caused by relating retained earnings
to a measure of rate of return that would be behaviorally related to retained
earnings, (ii) use a measure of the marginal effective rate of tax on new in-
vestment, rather than an observed average or statutory tax rate, (iii) hold
constant the influence of non—tax variables on FDI, and (-Lv) take account of
the data collection process which introduces increasing underestimation of Ff1
as the time elapsed from the previous benchmark survey of Ff1 increases.The
results of this new empirical approach are generally supportive of a negative
impact of U.S. effective rates of taxation on total Ff1 and transfers of funds,
but-not on retained earnings.There is, however, at least one very successful
alternative explanation of FDI in the U.S.——that it is propelled by stagnation
in the home country, as measured by its unemployment rate of prime—age males——
that precludes the association of U.S. tax rates with Ff1.—27—
In the second approach I examined the time series of FDI in the U.S.
disaggregated by the seven major investing countries.This disaggregation
allows a detailed examination of the effect on FDI in the U.S.of the rates
of home country taxation and the home country's system of taxing foreign
source income (i.e.exemption versus worldwide taxation with a foreign tax
credit).The results of these country analyses generally corroborate the ag-
gregate analysis of the effect of U.S. taxes on FDI.However, they are not
generally supportive of several propositIons about the differential tax sensi-
tivity of FDI from countries that exempt foreign—source income from domestic
taxation compared to countries that tax worldwide income and offer a foreign
tax credit to mitigate double taxation.The inability to support these
propositions may be due either to the difficulties in accurately measuring
home country effective tax rates or may indicate that, because of deferral
and the availability of sophisticated financial strategies, the home country
tax rate and its system of alleviating international double taxation is not
an important determinant of foreign direct investment.—28—
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Intercept 2.602 2.486 2.71 0.780
(0.510) (0.574) (0.422) (0.152)
Durbin—Watson 1.82 2.04 1.92 1.47
statistic
0.734 0.731 0.731 0.050
Notes:
1.Dependent variable is the logarithm of ((1000RE/GNP +1.23).
2.Column1 corresponds to equation 2 of Table II.2b in Newlon (1987).
3.Allindependentvariables are in logarithms.
4.Standard errors in parentheses.—29—
Table2



















Intercept —0.485 —2.429 —2.07 0.195
(1.541) (0.827) (0.617) (0.197)
Durbin—Watson statistic 0.34 1.67 1.80 0.68
j2 0.104 0.794 0.788 0.407
notes:
1.Dependent variable is the logarit of ((1000TR/GNP) +1.676).
2.Column1 corresponds to equation 4 of Table 11.2b in ewlon (1987).
3.Allindependentvariables are in logarite.
4.Standard errors in parentheses.—30—
Table 3



















Intercept —1.215 —4.079 —4.18 —0.978
(2.712) (1.603) (1.198) (0.367)
Durbin—Watson 0.46 1.67 1.80 0.60
statistic
P 0.183 0.772 0.765 0.332
Notes
1.Dependent variable is the logarithm of (1000FDI/GNP).
2.All independent variables are in logarithms.
3.Standard error3 in parentheses.—31—
Table 4
Further Regression Results for FDI
Sample Period 1960—87 1969—87 1960—87 1960—87 1960—87
Dependent
Variable FDI/GNP FDI/GNP RE/GNP TR/GNP FDIMF/GNP
Mean of Dependent
Variable 2.85 3.91 0.54 2.31 0.61
Independent
Variables
—7.11 8.81 1.40 —8.51 0.660
(7.22) (11.35) (1.87) (7.08) (1.96)
4.28 9.47 —0.199 4.48 —0.53
—1 (8.35) (9.23) (2.16) (8.17) (2.27)
'—2
—10.25 10.82 0.689 —10.94 —2.27
(6.25) (10.87) (1.61) (6.11) (1.70)
RGDP —1.36 15.78 0.551 —1.91 —3.37
(6.63) (20.29) (1.71) (6.48) (1.80)
USUNEMP 10.24 —183.0 —14.95 25.19 13.07
(40.32) (77.92) (10.41) (39.42) (10.94)
FUNEMP 440.61
(177.41)
REXC —6.21 —4.31 —1.49 —4.72 —2.83
(3.30) (3.77) (0.851) (3.22) (0.894)
DRIFT —0.036 —0.135 —0.050 0.014 0.0412
(0.114) (0.148) (0.029) (0.111) (0.0309)
Intercept 16.18 —23.70 2.00 14.18 7.77
(9.66) (31.33) (2.50) (9.45) (2.62)
—13.08 29.10 1.89 —14.98 —2.14
(3.46) (18.72) (0.89) (3.38) (0.939)
Durbin—Watson
statistic 1.30 1.29 1.87 1.24 1.39
0.677 0.717 0.455 0.696 0.558
Notes:
1.FDI is measured in $millions,and GNP is measured in $billions,so
that the dependent variable is 1000 times the actual value of FDI
divided by GNP.





































































































Regression tquat1ons Explaining Transfers of Funds, Sy investing Country











—) (1.01) (3.874) (1.43)
-.Ci64 —0.6)3 —).099
(1.065) (3.650) (1.071)
902P 17.7 3.940 —68.8
(7.94) (3.65) 141.))
CS1I5JES8P —4.90 —1.35 11.02
(5.28) (4.84) (6.33)
9E00 1.48 —0.073 —0.672
(1.09) (3.053) (3.194)
DRiFT —0.20882 —0.0018 3.36992
(0.0157) (0.01)9) (3.3191)
Intercept —2.67 3.765 4.55
(1.98) (0.739) (2.07)
"Enenpt ion'Countries
Oct he r I a nds
1960—87
3.369
!orei8n Tan CredIt Touot,3e,
Sect
Cernanv Italy linen 01g0un




—1.93 —0. 2)9 —1.39 . 066
(0.9601 (3.265) )).V) (2.
2.17 0.126 3.633 —1.69
(1.32) (3. 178) (1.1511 '2.68)
—2.57 0.0287 —1.'7 —2.79
(0.756) (0.232) (1.23) 2.19)
—3.72 2.53 —6.90 —0.919
(6.67) (2.25) (2.41) 22.6)
—(.55 —0.1)3 5.90 03.5
(5.06) (0.9)7) (6.62)).
—0.229 0.633)76 —0.00676 —0.79
(3.129) (7.00606551(3.03196) (191
0.00265
I —6.36760 3.0)76 '.0637
3.0)29) (0.00216) (3.3)99) 00,04390
2.1) —0.477 3." 7.0'
(1.451 (0.1891 (1.04) '7.63)
—1.33 —3.0640 —2.43 —4.30
(0.651) (3.0888) ('0.193) '1.63)
2.32 2.09 1. '6 1.12









V 3.238 0.297 3.608
See notesto TabLe 4.—34—
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-0.801 -0.302 -1.72 3.0101 -2.76 --.30
(0.398) (0.943) (0.654) (0.0817) (0. 583) 1.':)
2.04 1.22 1.60
0.182 0.613 0.375






























































































Regression equations xplaining Total FDI in Manufacturing,
Sy Investing Country
"xemption" Countries Foreign Tax Credit Countries
United
Country Canada Netherlands Japan Kingdom
Sample
Period 1960—87 1960—87 1960—87 1960S7
Mean of
I




-r '.129 0.356 0.105 0.462
(0.477) (0.874) (0.312) (1.15)
1 0.0419 —0.232 —0.231 —0.723
—1 (0.546) (1.01) (0.343) (1.36)
r —0.674 —0.173 —0.207 —1.71
—2
(0.444) (0.773) (0.254) (1. 18)
RGDP 9.57 —1.19 —10.3 0.0639
(3.31) (1.80) (9.7) (10.31)
USUNEMP —2.84 2.71 0.192 2.26
(2.20) (4.99) (1.0) (5.07)
REXC 0.542 —0.00171 —0.0687 —1.69
(0. 453) (0.00139) (0.0459) (0.675)
DRIFT —0.00707 0.00322 0.000990 0.0301
(0.00656) (0.0148) (0.00451) (0.0187)
Irttercept —1.21 1.02 0.839 1.65
(0.827) (0.779) (0.489) (1.64)
1÷1
1+1 0.103 —0.369 —0.333 —1.47
— —2
(0.310) (0.444) (0.198) (0.744)
Durbirt—Watsort
statistic 2.14 1.96 1.46 0.711
0.197 0.169 0.452 0.466
Seetotes to Table 4.Table 9

























































1.72 —0.0907 0. 118
(1.03) (0.102) (0.09)















































Seenntea to Table 4.Table 10
Pegression Equaclons Oxplaining Transfer, if Finds Using .6ome Councrv Tax Dana.Sy tnvesnng Cauncrv
nempnion" CountrIes ari Tax CredIt Count,),,
Country Canada France Sermartv Italy Japafl Klngdot
Period 965—96 1962—87 962—87 1962—87 1972—97 962—97








-0.170 0.363 1.93 0.130 —0.239 -3.91
(1.48) (0.9651 (0.949) (0.179) (2.82) '2.92)
= -0.235 -0.520 1.39 0.222 -0.0543 0.US
—— (1.35) (0.769) (1.26) (0.186) (3.12)
0.246 0.253 —6.76 —0.389 16.6 2.25
(1.56) (0.716) (3.25) (0.208) (24.6) (1.92)
2.24 —0.0640 —1.54 0.123 —(7.2 2.69
(1.07) (0.639) (2.29) (0.248) (23.0) (1.71)
2
0.707 —0.816 4.79 —0.0671 26.1 1.53
— (1.18) (0.866) (2.47) (0.161) (18.6) (2.98)
DLFSTAI —5.82 —2.17 —7.58
I _35 ).42 2.02
(5.28) (2.35) (2.95) (0.347) (7.39) (3.9)
ROOP 40.1 . —0.286 21.7 5.56 —32.1 —37.9
(16.7) (5.89) (11.0) (2.15) (30.1) (23.6)
USUNE.MF —11.0 —1.98 —9.87 —1.56 26.7 (2.0
(8.24) (5.55) (5.60) (1.34) (26.4) (9.64)
REXC 1.64 —0.0910 0.261 0.000259 —0.0104 -3.08
(1.26) (0.0633) (0.201) (0.0000701) (0.00472) (1.53)
DRIFT —0.00936 —0.00668 —0.0331 —0.0106 0.0196 0.2326
(0.310) (0.0159) (0.0183) I (0.00344) (0.0697) (0.2479)
Intercept —4.79 1.49 —1.43 —0.636 9.37 -9.59
(2.43) (0.969) (1.84) (0.222) (6.86) (3.93)
—1.95 —1.08 1.69 —0.00784 0.374 —3.69
-- (1.27) (0.537) (1.22) (0.103) (4.55) (1.66)
TnTxl 3.19 —0.627 —3.61 —0.333 (5.5 5.59
— —2 (2.66) (1.30) (2.56) (0.208) (18.8) ('.32)
Durbin—8atsxn
oracisric 2.09 1.96 2.26 2.44 1.76 2.-s
0.304 0.0816 0.549 0.463 0.512 2.260






















































































Regression Equation. Exp)alning total FDU Using Rome Country Tax Data, By InvestIng Country
Essmptinn' Countries jjn tax Credit Countries
Jest Cnicxd
Canada Franc. Danany Italy lapin K)vgdon
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.tatttix 2.34 3.96 2.16
0.393 0.0547 0.422
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FIGURE3
FDIintheUS. asa Fraction o( WoddwldeFDIof Seven CountrI, 1962-S3
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APPENDTX:DATA DEFTNITIOJS ANDSOURCES
1.Foreign Direct Investment.Taken from several issues of the Survey of
Current usiness.The most recent citation is August, 1988:"Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States:Detail for Position and Balance
of Payment Flows," Tables 12—19.
2.U.S. Marginal Effective Corporate Tax Rates N).Auerbchand Hines
(1988), Table 1, Column 1.The 1987 tax rate is obtained by thultiplying
their 1986 figure by the ratio of the post—tax—reform and pre—tax—reform
effective tax rates on capital in Fullerton and Karayannis (1987), Tables
TV.5 and P1.6, Column 3.
3.Foreign Marginal Effective Tax Rates (T).For France, Italy, the U.K. and
West Germany, these are calculated from separate series on the effective
tax rate equipment and structures provided by Julian Alworth.The overall
effective tax rate is equal to /(L—t)) +(a t5/(1.t5flh/ta /Utç)
+ a5/(1—t)J, where tE and t5 are te effctive tx rates on equpment
and structures, respectively, and ar and a5 are the fraction of the capi-
tal stock in equipment and structurs, respectively.This formula is taken
from King and Fullerton (1984).The value of aE is set to be 0.585, and
as to 0.415.This corresponds to the fraction of capital stock in equip-
ment and structures, respectively, in manufacturing found by King and
Fullerton for both the United Kingdom and West Germany, the only two
European countries they investigate.
For Japan, the tax-rate series is taken from Tajika and Yui (1988), Table
3, Column 4.These calculations include the effect of personal taxes.
However, the personal tax parameters are either small in magnitude (the
capital gains tax is zero) or unimportant (the tax on dIvidends is pre-
sumed to affect only the cost of capital financed by new share issues,
which constitutes only 3.6% of total finance).The values for 1985 through
1987 are set equal to the 1984 rate.
For Canada, the tax rate series up to 1981 is from oadway, Bruce and Mintz
(1987), Table 3.3, Column 10.Comparable values for 1982 through 1987 were
provided by Jack Mintz.
A.U.S. and Foreign Statutory Corporate Tax Rates.U.S. rate taken from
Pechman (1987), Table A—8.Foreign rates taken from sane sources as above.
U.S. rate is federal only.
5.Relative GDP (RGDP).Up to 1985, real CUP for each country is calculated
by multiplying real CUP per capita in current international prices by the
population.The real CUP per capita and population measures are taken
from the supplement in diskette to Summers and Heston (1988).Real GDP
for 1986 for each country is calculated as the 1985 CUP caluclated as above
multiplied by one plus the rate of real growth as reported in OECDMain
Economic tndicators (1988) pp. 37—41.1987 real GDP is calculated in a
similar manner.—50—
6.U.S. UnemploymentRate (USUNEM?).U.S. unemployment rate for males20
yearsand over taken from Economic Report of the President, 1988, Table
—39.
7.Foreign Unemployment Rate (FUNEM?).For each country, it is the unemploy-
ment rate for males ages 25 to 54 taken from OECD, Department of Economics
and Statistics, Labor Force Statistics, (1966—1986), pp. 472—501 (and var-
ious back issues).The overall foreign unemployment rate is a weighted
average of these rates, using 1975 real GD?'s as the weights.
8.Real Exchange Rate (REXC).For each country, it is the product of the no-
minal exchange rate (foreign currency/USS) and the ratio of GD? deflators
(US GD? deflator/foreign GD? deflator).1987 nominal exchange rates taken
from OECD Main Economic Indicators, October 1988, p.30.1987 GD? defla—
tors are calculated using the percentage change in GD? deflators from 1986
to 1987 in OECD Quarterly National Accounts (1st quarter 1988).The 1987
GD? deflator for the Netherlands was calculated using the percentage change
in the C?I from OECD Main Economic Indicators, October 1988, p.140.GDP
deflators up to 1986 are from OECD National Accounts (1960—1986), Chart 31,
pp. 138—9.Nominal exchange rates up to 1986 are taken from the same
source, Chart 2,pp. 150—1.
The overall real exchange rate is calculated by setting real exchange rates
in 1975 levels to one and then weighting the change from 1975 real exchange -
ratelevels by their respective shares of real GD? in 1975.—51—
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